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1.

Introduction
The study of the dynamics of social systems, especially
the attempt to predict the behavior of very large social
organisms on the basis of an analysis of the information
content distributed within that organism, poses wery many
theoretical questions. 'The issue has become essential for
such studies as the recently proposed analysis of the
spread of nuclear armament and the search for effective
measures of retardation.(l)
The processes which may lead a nation to adopt a particular
form of armament are not neccessarily different from those
which may lead a nation to accept some institutional changes,
or from those which may lead a nation to accept the shift
from peace-like behavior to war-like behavior. These processes
it is realized, are governed by historical perspectives
developed within a nation, and have often far reaching
future consequences whether these consequences are taken into
consideration or not.
Many attempts to explain the regularities of such changes
make reference to such concepts as "national climate",
·"war-mood 11 ( 2), "international tension 11 ( 3, 4), or other
scaleable atti tu.de dimensions as "friendliness-hostility" (5).
Common to these attempts is the fe:tllilu:=.tm.mmonfo�hmhessehn�ilir
under study in terms of a few continuous variables. While
the amount of emotional envolvement has been shown to be
a significant determinant of the directions in which socio
political changes occure most probably, it must be kept in
mind that these changes may also be the result of intelligent
decisions. Decisions, on the other hand, require
a) the existence of a set of essential values which are
supposed to be kept in certain limits,
b) a set of perceived alternative actions or behaviors
to be decided upon, and
c) information about the state of affairs, enough to make
non-random choices between tho available alternntives.
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Where decisions are effecting the cause of events, the
observable changes have usu.ally the form of stepfunctions.
Where stepwise changes are manifest, the representation of
that behavior in continuous variables is very difficult if
not impossible.
As said under c), intelligent decisions require enough
information. Where n? information is available, the
decisions can not be better than chance. This fundamental
law (which, incidentally, Ashby formulated quantitatively
as the "law of requisite variety 11 (6)) stro�y justifies
the attempt to make inferences from the avalable information
to the decisions which are expected to be made.
Large social systems have the empirical advantage of
providing considerable access to the information circulating
within: mass media, announcements, instructions of any kind,
authorized peceptions and predictions. It is this access
to internal processes which makes the study of a social
system fundamentally different from the study of, say, the
human brain.
..

··-.'

Every society has in some form or another specialezed agencies
to scann the environment, transmitt the relevant information
to large portions of its population, and provide organizationa.L
pattern for the respective segments of that society in
preparation for expected events. How these perceptions,
predictions, and suggestions for appropriate organization
pattern
come about, need not concern us here. Significant
·
al
is here to notice that these organization11 patterns can only
be established through communication, through distribution
of instructions, through distribution of information as to
what happened, why,, and what can be done about it.
For the stu�y of the information content and the attempt to
infer from this content to future behavior, the framework
of content analysis and the structure of the computation
procedures with their the�retical assumptions are of
parrunount importance. The following is an attempt to
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approach a possible theory of future-directed behavior of
very large social systems, as it may be infen13d from the
information content circulating and accumulating within
that system. The behavior can be called "future-rdirected"
since it is assumed that the decisions as to the selected
actions are made in reference to, and evaluation o� their
expected consequences. Such an assumption see�s very reason
able in view of the many references to future states which
an analysis of a political discussion uncovers so easily.
This assumption does not mean 11 rationality" in any conventionaJ
sense.
The statistical analysis of verbal material makes frequent
use of attitude scales, theories of attitude change, and
especially the very recently developed models of cognitive
balanye. It seems therefore in place to discuss briefly
some implicit difficulties of the application of such
explanatory concepts to the problem under consideration.
Theories of cognitive balance assume a tendency toward a
"mental homeostasis" (7) and postulate conditions under
which a cognitive structure tends to change toward a more
desirable, "balanced" state. Such formulations have been.
found to hold within one organism and requires, as one
. can easily show, rich communication between the component
parts of that organism. While similar homeostatic phenomena
exist between interacting segments of a social system, it
is almost impossible to decide whether a particular piece
of information is incompatible with a segment's view or not,
exept in terms of differential observations. A social structu�E
can not be reduced to a mass of single individualsl The very
fact of communication within a social system reflects consider
able heterogeneity •.
Al·though the definition of "attitude" refers in one way or
another to a "readiness to respond", the models of attitude
change refer mainly to the perception of situations in the
present. Only Abelson I s paper on "Hot Cognition" (8) menti ones
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"liked" or "disliked" consequences of a cognitive element.
The number of cognitive elements with which the contemporary
models can deal with·is so small, that chains of some
"futurity" as well as their hierarchical organization can
rarely be considered. This lack is not just a matter of
extending the existing formulations. "Means-end" relations,
"voluntary suffering .. in view of future succes13",. "policy
commitments" can not so easily be formulated in terms of
favoirable or unfavourable cognitive elements.

��

The balance models of attitude change conceive of modificationi
as an entirely cognitive and internal affair. That· is,
balanced states are achieved by internal manipulation mf the
receiyed stimulation, not by active operation on the
relevant portions of the environment.-These models are
almost incapable of dealing with actions as they are causally "
related to perceived situations via cognitive processes.
This much��oo-brief criticism should not imply the suggestion
that all the difficulties will be overcome in the following
outline of content analytic and inferential procedures. There
may be even worse simplifications and gaps. However, it is
hoped that the formulations of processes potentially under
lying future-directed behavi·or of large social systems may
be contributory to the development of models with more
explanatory power.
It follows the rough outline of a flow chart for the
simulation of future-directed behavior (or attitu.des, if
one accepts the generalization of this concept to smcial
organism) of a very large social systen, called Nation X.
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Flowchhar:mt for simulation future-directed behavior
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The flow chart indicates the order of some typical processes
involved in the simulation of future directed behavior.
The messages which are gathered in nationXX: are analysed,
coded into a computable form, and classified into three
main types of statements, a) Statements of X's perceptions
of its present situation:·e·statements of facts imposed on X
due to opponents in the e�vironment. b) State�ents;�ntended
actions, plans, and their evaluation. Such statements will
be discussed in terms of policies. c) Statements of X's
perception of its own executed actions. These are statements
e<re
of facts which,� under control of X. All three types. of
statements may be supplemented or completed by utilizing
information from other countries. But, this will be left
for a later stage.

The active memory contains all relevant policy statements
which are potentially available within nation X. Operations
on this memory compare incoming policy statements with stored
ones and reevaluate the content of the active memory
continuously.
The simulator state is supposed to represent X's policies
presently under execution and partly determining what will
happen in the future of X. The antumatic strategizer
retrieves policy statements from the active memory according
to the simulator state and the incorruning input statements.
After correlation of the predicted actions with the ones
that actually occurred, the experimenter is expected to
modify parts of the simulator's processes in orde��increase
the goodness of fi�t:

If the simulator has become sufficiently reliable, it can
be used for pseudo-experimentation. The experimenter has
sufficient access to the input of the simulator and can
ask what will happen if the input changes in a particular
way. The experimenter obtains therefore answers to such
questions as: Given a nation in a particular state, what
will be its response to a particular action of its opponent.
Given a nation's state, what should be avoided in order
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Or: Given a nation's state, what kinds of actions should
be avoided in order not to force a nation to respond in
an undesired way. Or: What internal changes can be derived
as essential to maintain a certain equilibrium between
interacting nations.
It is conceivable, although outside the scope of this
discussion, that several simulators be couple.d such that
a simulation of the dynamics of international systems be
possible.

o9

3.

The structure of statements.
According to the flow chart on pa�e 6, the outcome of the
content analytic procedure are three types of statements:
input statements, policy statements, and action statements.
Of considerable importance is the structure of these
statements such that certain computation procedures can
be applied with desired results.
The problems of coding the printed material into a proper
framework for content ru1alysis are, today very well handled.
Only one relatively new routine might be mentioned which
applies to all three types of statements. Statements are
often specialized cases or a form of other statements.
Ai and Aj may both be an instance of Ax, and Ax be an
instance of A 0• The instancing of proper names is frequently
presented in so-called taxonomies, but, also verbs and
predicates may have instances. Since several processes within
the simulator are defined as conditional to the occunence of
a particular statement, the content analytic proce�ure must
provide information which enables to decide whether or not
a particular statement is a sufficient instance of the
specified condition. The problem of instancing statements
has been dealt with in set theoretical terms and utilized
'by Abelson (6) for a so-called "explicability routine". His
work should be consulted for a detailed discussion.

-;;-

a
1

Input statements and action statements.
As mentioned above the content of input statements refers to
inevitable happenings, events which are directed toward the
perceiver, in other words, the perceptions of facts not
under control of the perceiving nation. For instance: "war
expenditures inureased 11 , "democrats won election", "Castro
is a communist", 'U2 entered Ihissian territory". Such statement
will be considered as ore unit whether it is of the form
11 A is 11, or
11 A happened", or
11 the opponen·t did A to us".

lo
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Similarly, action statements will be treated as a single
unit, whether they are of the form
"we do Y2
"we arrived at Y", or
,,.
"Y was successful".
B±ril.Jn].�i�aueaili.satateme.:tttens.
Very many utterance qan be coded into causal forms. For
instance "China invades India" can become "China caused the
invasion of India","Fascism is guilty of World War II" may
become "Fascism caused World War II", or "Hitler's a
agressiveness toward •••" can be rewritten as "Hitler's
tendency to cause the agression of•••"• Typical verbal
manifestations of causations have the form
"X causes Y",
"if X then Y",
11
Y is the consequence of X", or
"X is a means to obtain Y".
Basic to primitive causal relations is that the events X
and Y refer to different steps in time/tto time t, say,
and time t+n. This may be denoted by an arrow as well as
by a time index:
A primitive causal relation will be assm.med tb be transitive,
single valued, and having a range of one and only one
element. A primitive causal relation is therefore not
neccessarily a mapping. It describes a transition from a
set of initial states to a terminal state. Thus, a primitive
causal relation is defined within a characteristic set of
events or states
a,b,c, .-••• ,z. This set is partitioned
into two subsets. One holding at time t constitutes the
domain of the primitive relation, the other at time t+n
constitutes the range of the primitive relation. By definition
the range has one element only. The range may or ma� not be
contained in the domain of the relation. A primitive causal
.relation may be written

11

n1

t

( a,b,c, ••• )---il►► Z Z

meaning "z is the successor of a, or b, or c, • ••

•

An example may be used for demonstration . Given a machine M
defined within the set of events a,b,c,d,e,f,g by a set
of primitive causal relations
••

( a,b,c )---➔-a
,,
( a ~)--�➔ b
1

( d )--:,,,. c

•

II

:
•
II

••

( �,g ) --:;;i.;;i,,. d
( a,e )---;,,..e

( d,f,g )-----.-f

The kinematic graph of M visualizes the restrictions which
the formulations of the primitive causal relations impose
on M's behavior :

o""llli:-·

0
-- g

Some of the restrictions which the primitive causal relations
impose on the possible behavior of M can be verbalized as
follows. There is no way of going from b to f exept via the
events a and d. M can neither maintain g, nor reach g :for
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a second time. Mcan not remain in b, c, d, and g for more
than one step. If the appropriate relations are applied,
Mmay remain in a, exhibit the cycle ababab or aacadcado,
but, if e or f are once reached, the machine can not leave
it within the defined limitations.
Implicit in the formulation of primitive causal relations
which govern the behavior of a machine is the.restriction
,,
which have to be made in Min
f
the
number
of
decision
0
order to determine its behavior fully. Within an unrestricted
machine of 7 states, 7 7 = 823543 possible alternative behaviors
- exist. Viithin the example above the number is reduced to 16.
Namely: at event a: D1,D2 ,n , or n 5 can be applied, at
4
event d: n3 or n6, and at event g: n or n 6• At event b, c,
4
e, and f, there are no choices.
c

Simple policy statements.
The transitive character of primitive causal relations
permits the formulation of more complex and lmnger causal
chains leading from a set of initial events to a terminal
one. In everyday life causal complexes have many names.
If they refer to some inevitable causes, one often talks
about natural systems, or machines governed by a set of
natural laws. If they refer to living social organisms,
one talks about stated intentions, normative behavior,
rules or plans. Here no essential difference will be made
between the behavior governed by inevitable natural laws
and behavior governed by willful determinations.
For the purpose of this paper the term "policy" will be
used to refer to a set of instructions or rules which guide
a behavior along� specified paths. A policy always has some
events which are conditional to its application, leaving
possibly undefined some of the intermediate steps, but
promising to lead to a terminal event at which either a
new policy must be adopted, or at which the machine remains
for an indefinite amount of time. A simple policy statement
usually combines several primitive causal relations into
a larger arrangement.
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There are many possible policies which can be defined within
the machine M of page 11. One may be selected for demonstra
tion. Let
"•

( a, b,g,)--�-f

such that wherever it starts, the machine should undergo
tlme$immme$heheyctels-aeaa and then go to f . Diagrammatical
this policy can be represented as follows:
Try
other
Policy

A pply
A!Wly
4

yes
no

Apply
Dl

, '
'

.,_

V

� ·" . .

•1'•/ '" '¥
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The formal similariry of the representation of a simple
policy statement to the kind of flow diagrams used in
computer programming is easily descernible. Note, that
there are two types of output: "failure" and "success".
If a policy fails to obtain what it claims,, other operations
must follow than if a policy is successful.
d Policy hierarchies. ,,.
After having defined the notion of primitive causal relations
between events, and the notion of simple policy statements
as being just more complex, one can now come to policy
hierarchies as they may �etermine the behavior of a very
large social system.

''--

First, a critic might question the usefulness of the concept
of an event as used in the previous discussion. Being in the
·"state of war" might from one point of view be an event,
a1-,d
labeled with a single term,nfrom another point of view be
the process of execution of certain well defined and planned
military actions, organized under the label "war policy".
These two interpretations refer in fact to the same phenomena,
and
however , 11treat this phenomena either as temporarily unanalysed
whole, as a unit, or treat it as structured. In fact the
viewpoint must be adopted here, that every event is in
principle (at least within the range of ou:b interest)
dissolvable upon closer analysis. Events will have to be
treated here as temporarily unanalysed "policies".

Thus policies must be seen as hierarchically organized in
the sense that a policy on a higher l_evel determines the
sequences of application of policies on a lower level, which
may in turn determine the execution of even lower level
processes. In terms of the diagrrun on page 13 it can easily
be imagined that the processes in the squared boxes be
replaced by a diagram similarly to the one drawn such that
the terminal elements of the policy in question, the successfu
GMd
output, is a member of the domain of the next policy,Ameets
the condition of application of the next policy.
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For the purpose of a shorter notation, one may adopt the
convention to denote a policy Pi, having the set Ci of
policies as its domain(= condition of application), and
Ti as its terminal element, by
�i(Ci:Ti) •

Given an arbitrary s�t of policy statements o� the form
outlined on page 13 , neglecting for a moment the possibility
of failure, one can easily see the way a policy hierarchye
can be organized.

P1(P 3 :P 8), P2(P4,P7 :P1), P7 (P 5 ,P6,P7 :P5), P5(P9 :P8),

P , P , P , P , P , without structural specification
3
8
6
4
9
It can easily be seen that P2 is the most general and highest
order policy in the set 9 ' By 11 fitting in"_ the various sub
policies, at least the domain and the terminal element can be
given in the most detailed form which is possible within the
set. While this example refers only to very simple forms of
organizable policy hierarchies, the general idea of a machine
which is governed by such a hierarchy of specifications can
be seen below. The state of such a machine, later called the
simulator, can be represented by a set of policies which are
under execution at time t and partly determine the cause of
future actions. Graphically it may be shown like this:
and

16
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j

--------------► P
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,,..____,,A

1

,A----,
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P9--------+P5

k
time

t
State

e

At every step in time t, M's state can be represented by·
the set {P.,
P., P k, ••• , P}
l
m �f relevant policies governing
J
an aspect· of M's future behavior. The ·number of members of
this set may vary as time progresses. Each policy is applied
on an initial set Ci of policies, determinig the sequence of
application of policies P , and terminating at Ti . The length
j
in time such a policy Pi effects future actions may be called
the futurity o< of the policy Pi ·at time t.

Polici� with input

The policies so far discussed refer exclusively to phenomena
of internal organization of future directed behavior. Of
considerable importance are, however, machines which take
into considerations events no·t; under control of the machine,
input statements refering to a segment of the environment

17
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of the sumulated system. It will not be dis.tinguished here
whether the environment of the perceiver is composed of
"nature" obeying a set of "natural laws", or composed of
interacting nations obeying their commitment to follow a
set of policies. Numerous examples from political documents
could be cited in which policy statements are made conditional
not only to events under ovm control, but alsp those under
the control of the environment. To mention only one such
statement made by Khruschev after the USSR wa:se able to shot,.
shoot down a U2 airplane: "If a foreign airplane enters
our territory uninvitedly (=Ai, it will be shot down by our
rockets (=Y��. The situation implied the ability to do so (=X),
Typical verbal manifestations have the form
11
If A happens and we are in X, we will do Y", or shorter
"A and X causes Y".
The input statement A may be composed of several elements
which all constitute the condition A for applying a stated
policy. A may be "the opponent intends to do G 'Wli..ch is
expected to have Has its consequence", or A may be a simple
compe.und like II F&H-G "• That which has been said three
pages ago about the nature of singular events applies here
as well. That is, input statements may be unanalysed events
or policies the detaiJs of which are known but not considered
in their structural qualities.
It will now be possible to come to the most general
representation of a policy with input as used in the laiter
discussion:

Given: A finite set 'Pof own policies P which will be
effectively applied on some portion of the environment
if the specified conditions R 0 A are met.
Given: A finite set.Pt-of events (or policies) A, perceived as
being representative for the state of the envirorunent.
R
Given: A finite set <R. of symbols ;. to represent the order in
which the various sub-policies of a given policy apply.

18
A particular policy Pi can then be defined:
within a characteristic setA-1 containing all input
a)
conditions{¢, A1, ••• , Aw, ••• , Am} which can effect
the execution of Pi. The zero-element¢ stands for
"no particular condition specified".
within a characteristic set °p 1 containing all
b)
sub-policies 1 pf.P1, R�� •••, Pu} of ? 1 ,
within a set(;\'i'of symbols {R0 , t1,, .R�, Ev'''Rrt • Rn sj
c)
representing the state of execution of policy P l..•
R o will
be reserved to signify the initial state of Pi,
,
F stands for "failure" and turns up if the terminal
a11d
state is not obtained,/\S stands for "successful
completion" of Pi, "stop", or "search for next policy".

h

A policy may now be represented tabularly where each ftdwe
determines one application of a sub-policy:

••

P'1

R0
Ro

1

Al

Pn

pl
•

P']J.
P'il

R'0
R'0

R-0
Rl

Am

pu
pl
•

P'u
P'1

R'0
R'1

¢

••

•

•
•••
••

••
•
•••

¢

..

••
•••
••
•••
•

••
••
•
••
••
••

.

.

pi

••

R'0

pl
•

Ro
•

.

iv
•
••
••
••
•
•••
•

'

•

R"n
l.}

Aw
••
•••
••
••
•••
•

Am

••

•
•••
•

••
•••
•
••
••
•

.

p• j
•
·•••
••
•••
•••

Pu

•
••

.

•
•••
•

••
••
•
•
••
•

.
..
.

..

•

•••
•
••

••
•••
•••
•••
•

.

p• �J

R'V

.
.

.. .

•
•••
•
••
••
•

P'u

•••
••
••
••
•

n•n
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All the couples Aw,Pj under the label R 0 constitute Ci,
the domain of Pi. Where R� takes the value of S, the Pj of
that line is the terminal element Ti, and the policy Pi
will then be executed.
From the previous discussion it is understood that each
policy statement occuring in the table, can be taken as
representing another table of transitions, similar to the
one of which it is a part.
It might be mentioned that very few policy statements
possess indeed the complexity which the tabular representation
is :�ble to �escribe. Often very few lines are sufficient to
represent a policy statement adequately.
f

Policy preferences.
Before the execution of policies will be discussed, two
dimensions of policy preferenoes must be defined. �he mere
statement of a policy in a given nation does not mean that
it be selected for application. For application preferences
some criteria are necessary •. It seems that the selection
of policies for execution can similarly be handled as in
game t�eory, however, without the assumption of perfect
rationality.
Certainty; Even verbal formulations of policies can, and
usually do, express different degrees of certainty as to
whether a particular· policy will bring about the eA'J)ected
result. Thia certaity that a policy leads to what it claims
is often discussed in terms of the tfuth of a statement,
the validity of a prediction, or the stre�h of belief,
and should not be confused with the probability that a
particular policy be selected for application.
Given an initial state, conditional to the application of
a particular policy, the certainty associated with that
policy will be expressed by a scale ranging from zero to
one, and treated as the probability (subjective probability)
of reachinG the terminal state of that policy.

20

Context-free value: The behaviors of very large social
systems are frequently associated with certain desirabilities,
are laden with affect, or have !lvniu::euei1i:mt1heme:reI-v-�s'',
independent from their occurence in a particular sequence
of other behaviors. Context-free values are often associated
with such terms as "goal", and in fact utopian constellations
may serve in that way. On the other hand, the. tendency to
maintain a particular ideological construct, imposed on the
behavior w!iithe organism which holds it, regardless of the
·means employed, illuminates the independence of these values
from the particular structure of whichtthey are a part.
Contex-free values may be measured by one of the many
methods of content anqlysis,· e.g. evaluative assertion analysiE
(lo), and mapped on a scale ranging from negative values
for aversions, via zero for value neutral policies, to
positive values for associated favourableness.

Compound value: If. the value of a particular policy is
instrumental to reaching a certain goal, then its value is
derivable only from the evaluation of its conteoct. The
policy in question is a means, not an end. Its value is
9ontext-bound. Although there is a considerable body of
literature available to this subject of value transfer, and
f:i'"'t will� be neccessary to utilize much of the knowledge
·about the conditions under which such a transfer is effective,
only a first formulation will be given below. This formulation
is �nlif meant to point to the direction whi�himhethe
computation �B e�tsxt�bound values, hereafter called
preferences, is expected to take.
Given a policy which determines the sequence of application
of subpolicies:
•
P , and
Pl ➔P2� •••
pi •
➔ pj";i,, ••• ➔ u
vj ::: The average context-free value associated with
the execution of policy Pj,
cj

::::

The certainty that policy Pj leads to its terminal
state, i.e. can be executed successfully,
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The preference wi ·associated with the policy P i is supposed
to represent its value relative to the certainty wmxlili.which
the values contained in it can be 9btained. The most general
formulation is: (Preference)= �Cer�ainty)x (Value).

rt.

;-

This expression makes clear that the certainty cj =
cr
r=l
with which a particular
value v. is believed
J
to be obtainable, cg.n only decrease as the length -of the
chain between the present- state and the state with which that
value is associated increases. Changes in the certainty
'effect the preferences for that particular policy proportional·
The summation sign, moreover, indicates that not only the
context-free value of the terminal state is considered
contributmn$ to the preferencei but also the values vj of
all Pj which are passed in executing P i.
FinallY,i the probability that P j can be applied under a
particular policy Pi must be considered. According to the
tabular representation on page 18, the transition from one
�olicy to Pj is dependent on the input A. Thus, the probabili�
of such ·a transition is the probability that the required
tnput occurss. Therefore:
e. = The expectancy that the input A meets the condition
J
for applying P j •
The preference Wi then becomes in its most general form:
.
j
u
w

1.

= e.J. c. v.' =
J.

J.

�

L__,,'

I[

j=l r=l
This equation shows in addition the dependency of the phil�\
prefer:ance. associated with a policy Pi at a certain state
on the probability that the environment provides the
neccessary conditions to pe.rsue that policy. The lower the
expectancy that the environment 11 000:perates" the lower is
the relative value or preference of going through the seouence
· of processes subsumed under the policy Pi .
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Procedures involving the strategizer

4•

{

The following will be a rough description of some of the
basic procedures of the "strategizer" of the simulator
outlined on page 6. The strategizer is an intermediate
operator between (1) the memory which is assumed here to
contain all relevant policies available withi? a nation for
aaoption, (2) the state of the simulator which represents
iL
the policies momenta�y under execution by a nation, and
,__, (3) the input statements which Jeffect the state of the
simulator. This last variable will be somewhat neglected
in the following ouliine. It will be taken up only in form
of the "comment on communication, cooperation, and competition'
Roughly speaking the strategizer selects policies from the
ac�tive memory and puts them into the state of the simulator,
satisfying the present conditions and using certain criteria.
a Adoption of simple policies a.t random.

v

The structuw of simple policy statements was given in section
3c. A policy always has a domain Ci which is conditional to
the application of Pi and a terminal element Ti. A simple
policy· statement is a representation of a policy which is
neither�ember of a higher order policy nor contains
subpolicies,1 i.e. has no membe:c with further structural
description.
In this case the state of the simulator alwa�rs has three
variables. "A" represents the policy Pi under execution,
11 the event P
11 B" the step� within policy P , and 11 C
i
j
whose occurence is being determined by P i. The following
procedure may be adopted as a program for the stategizer
adopting §it�le policies at randcm:

(1)

""I

(2)

Is B in the state of Sor F?

yes: go to(3)
no : go to(2)
replace P j by P j in C alJ/iRv by R� in :S.,
go to (1)

J1

c:L�.-CL-

'

,;,.,

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Keep last event P at C,, erl!'iasEf A and :B .,
j
go to (4)
Return Pi to active memory.
go to (5)
Take a policy Pi at random from ac·tive memory .,
go to (6)
Is previous Pj pontained in domain Ci of- the new P1 ?
yes: go to (7)
no : go to (4)
Set A to Pi, B to R 0 •
go to (2)

Such a strategizer which selects and executes simple
policies in the way outlined above, may get "trapped 11 :
l • . if it reaches the terminal state of a policy which is
not contained in any domain of the policies in the active
memory, and
2. if a policy ha� no explicit terminal element and makes
the simulator tct behave in cycles.

b Heuristic evaluation of simple policies.

:_/j

Given -an initial event and the active memory containing
policies Pi each of which is associated viith a particular
preference wi, the task of the strategizer may be to select
not only a policy which can be applied on the terminal state
v of the completed policy, but, moreover one that promi�es
an optimal gain. The test of the possible policies for the
highest preference value should, howe'l?'er, be li_!Ilited to a
finite number of trials, i.e. it should be a heuristic rather
then a systematic evaluation. A heuristic evaluation
procedure for a strategizer handling simple policies could
be specified as fallows. An additional store D (delay),,,/-,
·i � �ii.hi> able to hold one p'Olicy vlill be needed.
(1),

(5)

(3), (4) will be as in section 4a.
Has test (7) been applied n times?
yes: go to (lo)
no : go to (6)
(2),
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Take policy Pi at Cat random from active memory.
go to (7)
Is previous Pj at C contained:i:!J,n domain c 1 of the new Pi?
yes: go to (8)
no : go to (4)
(8) Is wi � wi-store ? (Is Pi J?E.�_fe�bl,ft to trie one in D ?)
yes: go to (9)
n� : go to (4) �
(9) Replace stored policy P i-store QY the more preferable
policy pi· and return Pi -store to the active memory.
go to (5)
(lo) Is D empty?
yes: go to (6)
no : go to (11)
(11) Take Pi from auxiliary store D, set A to Pi, and B to R 0
go to (2)
Again the stn:>stegizer puts policies from the active memory
into practical use. Their comparative evaluation leads to
the adoption of the most preferable policy within the
patience factor of n trials (if at least one applicable
policy falls within n). The simulator stops under the same
condition as in 4a.
(6)

'J

o

�,./

,. ,, •• ! )

Completion of higher order policies.

The procedures 4a and 4b did not consider hierarchically
organized policies. The focus will now be on the way a
higher order policy may be executed by "filling in" lower
order policies up to the level of unanalysed policies, i.e.
given an initial state_ Pz and the committment to apply a
:particular higher order policy P.J. , how can su:ordinated
policies be selected adequately such that Pi is at every time
"linked" with the lowest level of unanalysed policies.
��eQuired
l."l1lS liask requires a set of variables, say, A, B, C, ••., z, :.
to represent the set of policies under execution a·b time t
as well as their step of execution. For instance A={•• P1 ••
Z= {• • pz • :}
B= [. •RV• •j C::::
D= [. • Rw• •] ' E= [••pk•
pj •

'

f. . .

.J '

.J ' • • •

J,
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Whether the mode of adoption is "first comes first" e.s in
4e., or heuristic as in 4b will not be considered here. The
very rough outline of the program should give only a general
idea of the procedural involvement.

First,1Pi may be printed on the far left in A and Pz on the
far right in z. Then the 1st, 2nd, ••••, nth �ember of P1 1 s
domain Ci will be printed in C and successively be tested
for identity with the symbol which Zexhibits at the moment.
If Pz is contained in Ci' Pz can be replaced by P� according
to Pi 1 s instructions. Now, if P� has a structural _description,
it will be placed in variable Z-2 such that it can be
executed in determining the sequence of events represented
in
If under P 1 mn.S or F turns up in Z-1, a new search
process has to start taking the state in Zand the first
state to the left of the next higher polio� into consideration.

y

z.

If the member of Ci on which the attention has been focused
is not identical with the state of z, there are two
possibilities: either the member has no structural description.
then the next member should be taken, again first tested for
identity with the lower policy to which a connection is
sought, then tested for whether a structural description is
available, or the 1st, 2nd, •••• , nth member of Pj 1 s domain
will be printed in E and successively be tested••••• •

'-/

Within a defined time limit and the given limit for storage
capacity, the testing, branching, replacing, ••• goes on until
a link has been established between the highest order policy
on the far left, and the lowest order one on the far right.
The lowest level policy will be executed first, step by step.
Then the next higher level policy will be completed. If an S
or F. terminates the adoption of a policy, the strategizer
will try to select another applicable one from the rich pool
of policies in the active memory. Since the relative levels
of policies are not reauired to be fixed, transpositions from
one variable to another might be neccessary.
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The job of the strategizer is to find a path on several
levels simultaneuusly. The path has been completed when
the highest level policy has been executed. The process
may,howeve� stop when no policy can be found which would
establish the required succession of events. The process
may also become caught in a cycle from which it can not
escape. These two ways of making the stategiz;er -'/:hneffective"
""<Jtie; particularly da:gerous since the described processes
do not include measures of avo�ding a trappwhich �nesabJ¥
poaru.ilbly;1,have been "fo:u:seen" by another type of mechanism.
d

awareness

This fourth process is supposed to avoid some of the "traps"
into which the above mentioned mechanism falls most
""7' probably. This process is said to �isess some sort of
''1
"foresight" called o<-awareness.
It should be remembered that the determining power or the fu
futurity of a given policy under execution covers only
that number of steps in time which are needed to reach
the terminal state of that policy. The process described
in 4c considers a next policy only after the futurity of
the previous policy has actually diminished. In common sense
terms 4c is "extremely shortsighted". This shortsightedness
accounts for the fact that such a mechanism can easily be
trapped, or, if it selects its policies heuristically, that
it might not be able to "bridge a valley" in order to
arrive at a more prefered "area". What is needed here is
a procedure which not only finds a way of executing a higher
order policy, but extends its attention beyond the futurity
of the policy under execution to a sequence of potential
successors.
Such an extention can be visualized as follows: Consider
a two-dimensional matrix in which each cell represents a
variable the value of which is either a policy Bror a lable R
for the step of its execution. One dimension represents as
in 4o the set of hierarchically organized policies which
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are req�ired to be followed simultaneously. The other
dimension of the matrix represents the content of future
steps as they are determined by each adopted policy on a
higher level. The number of future steps which such a
mechanism is able to consider is not only determined by
the futurity of the available policies, but significantly
limited by the size of the matrix (or storage.capacity)
in which the organized anticipatory policies can be
represented, and by the available time to select, test,
compute, and shift the content of i.ts cells as the execution
of policies proceeds. In concrete cases these capacital
limitations can be given quantitatively and define the
ability of the strategizer to exhibit what was here called
oc- awareness.

"<

a

The procedures which lead to 0(-awareness are too involved
to be described here in detail. Similarly to 4c they
r·equire operations on the stores, now, however, over two
dimensions, scanning, evaluating, replacing, and shifting
whole lineso
j f printed symbols, trying to "keep ·up" with
the changes caused by the successive execution of the
pre-organized policies. The simulator will stop as for
strategizers 4a, 4b, and 4c when no policy can be found
to continue the process. However, the trapping phenomenon
can now only occure' outside the Crlimit of awareness.
Goal directed policy selection.

It happens that in some social systems that goals are defined
in advance and means are adopted to approximate them, although
the way to reach such ::g�, might not be known in oletail.
~,,, )

Principially it is possible to reach a goal with a strategizer
of type 4-b if the process is not trapped before reaching it.
However' the probability of;ofilrn!-Jt this "most prefe{ed II policy
statement by chance may be very low and the process of
proceeding that way very unreal.
Essential to purposeful behavior is the evaluation of policies
_according to whether they ar:e contributing to the goal
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approximation or not, and only to the extent,, this evaluation
of the mntermediate steps is possible, reaching a goal is
better than chance. In the sense of the proposed policy
framework, this would require the existence of a polio�
which links at any time the state of the simulator with
the final state, the most prefered policy, or the goal.
Such a policy can be treated as the highest l.evel policy
by a strategizer of type 4c whereby the computed preferences
(perhaps computed as suggested on page 21) continuously
increase as the goal policy comes closer.
Unfortunately, it is a reality, and the analysis of
political content strongly suggest, that many policy
statements_�re neither precise nor determine the sequence
d>f
coiistituent processes completely. There may be
considerable "freedom" in going from one specified process
to the one which is specified next, leaving large portions
of the intermediate steps open. Where this incompleteness
occurs within�-awareness, the intermediate policies
assumed to be existent, it is perfectly possible for a
strategizer to find the goal. All four strategizer types
will be essential for such goal-directed policy selection1t.e.
4c for maintaining the "general orientation of the attention"
according to the highest order policy, 4a for randomly
�electing policies where no successors are explicitly
defined, 4d for extending the attention up to the next
"reference point" within-the highest order policy, 4b for
evaluating the paths withinC(-awareness before the selected
policy arrangement is actually adopted for use. This process
of "bridging incompleteness" does of cause not only refer
to the highest order policy, it mus t be thought of a standard
repertoire of the strategizer on every level.

!i,'ts-,

This procedure illuminates what is probably of high generali t;::
that the incompleteness of a policy or plan can only be
afforded within the limit of O<-awareness.
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Comments on.communication, cooperation, and competition
The strate��er§so far discussed refer exclusively to
phenomena of internal organization of future directed polic,.r
sequences. Of considerable importance for a simulation of
social behavior is, on the other hand, a strategizer which
considers events not under the control of the simulated
organism, a strategizer which is sensitive to. input statements
Firstly, it is immediately obvious that the hierarchical
structure of the adopted policies require a peculiar
understanding of communication between several _so designed
simulators. Each policy on each level may be sensi'tive to
another set of inputs upon the occu�tnce of which a
particular policy may be replaced by its successors. Thus,
the structure of the sensitivity of the set of policies
presently adopted or presently within the �-awareness,
imposes a particular structure on the incomming information.
Here such notions as Ruesch's ''meta-information" finds its
mechanical equivalent, i.e. meta-information may reduce the
uncertainty concerning a situation, while information refers
to messages which are interchanged in true obeyance of the
established mituation. In this framework some statements of
the input may be conditional to a higher order policy, and
some other effect only the selection of lower order ones.
�hus, one may like to distinguish between several levels
on which communication may take place, having longer or
shorter effects.

llsb"'s 1i:ose.d.v6Jl:I.tagenhnske:eend"ta.ktage. of the fact that many
-� :srtp:ttemeilla;ilembmlim eueuts not under control of the perceiver,
can in fact be successfully be treated as the� perceptions of
the opponent's policies. It seems therefore quite possible
ibz» ��WU<ll?fP) ��rsmn containing an active memory of inputs,
a representation of the perceived state of the opponent, and
a strategizer mediating between both 0• This mechanism proceeds
purely on the basis of the incomfr1ing sta-t;ements about the
opponent and constitutes what is usuably refe:{ed to as the
"image of the environment". This image, being continuously

'<..
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modified similarly to
is "k ept up to date"�
c• ...," ,·) �
✓ for the formation and
(',.c � c.__r,,_,,.k -. the prim0fU concern in

the way the state of the simulator
has now to interact with the mechanism
execution of own policies which waBe ,. •
the previous pages.

In fact the expectancy terms in the expression for the

preference of a policy had to be based on some sort of
forecast of the opponent's behavior and requir.ed· a
representation of the knowledge about the environment. In
this framework the set of policies perceived as being
adopted bi the environment has to be taken into consideration.
In other words the expectancy terms of the suggested
expression for compu·ting policy preferences become only
meaningful in reference to the interaction between the two
images: the image of the environment, and the image of the
own adopted policies or the 11 self-image 11 •
Concerning the hierarchical character of both images, the
communication between them may be vi&rualized as follows:
Environmental Image

Self-Image
--- ----·->T.

1

-----:;i,..T.
J
--�T
k

While an opponent's policy� may effect the transition from
p to P' on the J-level, A v may have no bearing on a policy
on the I-level. In this schematic drawing, P1 is in fact
unsensitive to any present state of the environmental image
while Pri being a direct constituent of Pk and an indirect
one of P-r.is determined by Au' Av' and Aw via Pk and Pj.
J)
,,
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One could go on and describe the coupling of a set of
y sinru.lators - always fe¢d by the content of•. the. information
circulating within a nation, building a self-image and an
environmental one, and operating on them simultaneously in order to analyse processes of international communication.
Here, the self-image of nation A, say, lea& to organized
behavior which in turn is perceived by a nation B, stored
v_ by it as the environmental image of A held by· B, utilized
to form ,own policies or the self-image of nation B, which
_
la-ter on has its bearing on A's environmental image of B,
and so forth. This coupling is the final goal of this
simulator development for large social systems. As the
reader may imagine, such a fo:rmal description of international
communication research procedures can become quite difficult.
The consideration of communication between the two
hierarchically organized images illust;rates still another
aspect of the proposed model: the perception of cooperation
and competition.

•

)
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Given the two sets of adopted policies, the one representing
the perceived other, the other representing the perceived
self, each additionally adopted policy, each change in the
set of policies may via changed expectancies either increase
or decrease the preference for a particular polio� in e�ther
set. Thus,the changes in the one set of policies may either
facilitate the execution of the policies in the other set, or
inhibit such processes; they may either support the locomotion
toward a goal or hinder it. This is usually referred to
'-, as cooperation or competition, and may in fact correspond to· ,
what·psychologists have measured in terms of friendly or
Y- hostiJi'actions. How sensitive the preference of a policy
1.5
arrangement/depends on the way it is conditional to certain
O.nc/
input statementsAcan be imagined by examining the expression
suggested for the computation of preferences on page 21.
111

The attempt of a strategizer to increase or maintain preferencE
will then correlate with the attempt to avoid policies the
expectancies of which, associated with the situation, a.re low.

'
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In other words, there will be a tendency to avoid disturbing

information, or a tendency to reduce communication in
competitive s ituations. Conversely, if the expectancy
associated with the interaction between the two images is
very high, that is the situation is a cooperative one, the
tendency to increase preferences is expected to correlate
with the emergence of coordination or the supportive
interlinkage of poliQies. __.r CJL
/ (I

Not very much h as been�; will be said about the effects
of partitionings within a nation. The activities which a
nation exhibits are certainly not exclusively cen�rally
controlled as -thi-Etmay be true for single individual;yr.
Each partitioning within a nation, whether it be a class
hierarchy, an institutionl order, or the structure of
production specializations, can be considered as having
unique policy resources from .which the presently adopted
ones are to be drawn. Thus, a nation may upon closer
examination of the relevant partitioning be viewed as a
communication system, i.e. a system of interlinked
components with more or less supportive interdependence
·-/ or with more or less cooperation. Many ·of the previously
asseverated mechanisms apply to such partit.ionings as well.
Under the focus of par·titionings within a nation, the
previously assumed singleness of goals within a nation or the
implied unambiguous and uniform evaluation of preferences
and values associated with policy arrangements and situations
must now be abandoned. It is intuitively as well as on the
basis of the asseverated mechanisms quite obvious that large
and par·titioned social systems may have to rnaintain very
many 11 unintegrated 11 goals simultaneously, may have to execute
very many possibly poo1�4J-y interlinked policies in parallel,
and may have to consider ·the conditional interdependencies
statistically. Th� are in fact very complex processes which
are rarely studied adequately. Perhaps the experimentation vdti
such mechanisms as the ones ·21>bove may help to understand some
of the underlying principles of the behavior of ver-J large
social systems.
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Comments on the operations on the memory content.
The strategizer con·tinuously evaluates and selects policies
Y from the· active memory according the the received input
message and in accordance with the state of the adopted
policies. Thus, the active memory must contain all the
relevant policy statements which are com.i"TIU.nicated within a
social system and available for application. ·

1. ,.
\J

,( The content analytic procedures mapp,' the statements irreversil:1
from a natural language into the policy frame of this
simulator. These policy statements which are contained in
the active memory must then be subject of continuous revision
due to
Inputs from the content analytic process,
1.
Retention characteristics within the memory, and
2.
Feedback through usage and ap�lication.
3.
The actual changes within the memory may refer to
a. Structural changes of the distribution within the content
of the memory, newl;'.>r formulated policies are added,
l·· ,.�.:..
"'C>thers ones are omitted if pro,g:v'en to be mistaken or v.:ronf'
Changes of the probabilities with which a policy is
b.
made available for selective tests by the strategizer.
ThEi:ra:' are the operational effects of "forgetting" and
"activating" certain policies.
Structural modifications of old policies t ·
c.
Changes in the certainties associated with each policy,
d.
Changes in evaluations of the polic;tes or constituents
e.
thereof.
It will
account
content
so that

be neccessary to devise a set of operations which
for this continuous revision of the active memory
according to the three main sources of change
the state of that memory is always "up to date".
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Concluding remarks

These first notes on a particular form of simulation of
Cltl,
y very large social systems on the basis of,,; extensive content
"/ analysis are obviously ·-a;ll'. a very early stage of the
dev�lopment. Many empirical and theoretical implications can
at this point not fully be €@t:emeta� The most severe
empirical limitations can be expected to lie
a.
in the problem of the mapping of the forms of natural
language into forms of the theoretical framework suitable
for the application of adequate computational proc�dures.
Whether this content analysis can be formulated as proposed
requires further studies,
b.
in the limited capacity to process the expected volume
of active policy statements. The number of policy statements
to be tested and evaluated in their interaction with other
policies, possibly as members of different images, is a very
large one. It has to be investigated whether the procedures
of handling policies within a simulator can be simplified
rigorously.
One of the theoretical problems of such a simulator is the
reliability of the prediction and the level of tlteigenerality.
tl�h:on�ttthe strategizer as discussed here always prepares
the most likely occuw,-ng further steps of the future-directed
behavior of a social system, corrects them as they become
incongruous with the content of the ovm behavior, it is
quite conceivable that the active memory does not represent
the policy resources of the decision makers within the social
system who are in a sense represented by the strategizer.
But, such uncertainties can only be reduced by further
information resulting from evidence. It is quite possible
that the only contribution these notes and the proposed
mechanism of simulation make aBethaa� �bl�tability.
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